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During the last 3 years, the Brazilian electricity industry has undertaken a major and 
deep restructuring process, started with an important privatizing program. The main 
steps in this process are the introduction of competition in generation, the 
deverticalization of utilities, permitting open access to the transmission and 
distribution grid, and the introduction of retail competition. 
Moving towards competition, the distribution utilities, usually at government level, 
must adapt themselves to this new competitive environment. For example, they must 
unbundle their services, e.g., create a new independent distribution (grid) company. In 
parallel, utilities must enhance their commercial activities since they no longer have a 
service monopoly. 
In the old model, a utility’s energy supply was ensured by means of supply contracts 
signed with the government energy company supplying the corresponding region of 
Brazil. Two coordination groups, organized at the federal level, were responsible for 
the generation planning (GCPS) and for the operation of the system (GCOI). Inside 
these groups, planning and operational decisions were made with close cooperation 
among all government companies and utilities. 
The new model, however, primes for competition. The regulatory framework is 
established by ANEEL (The Brazilian National Commission for Electrical Energy) and 
executed by a system operator (ONS). Likewise, the introduction of competition in 
generation has led to the creation of an energy market (MAE). In order not to expose 
the utilities and consumers to the volatility of prices that may occur following such a 
dramatic change, an 8-year transition period has been established. During this 
transition period, utilities will gradually be exposed to and must adapt themselves to 
the new competitive environment. 
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Focusing on this 8-year period (1999-2007) of transition from the present cooperative 
model to the new competitive model, consideration must be given to alternative 
solutions available to replace the old supply contracts in the energy portfolio of a 
distribution utility such as CEB, the company with the present distribution monopoly in 
Brasilia, the capital of Brazil. The effects of the new policy on open access and retail 
competition must be studied and an economic assessment of all supply alternatives 
made, showing how the price of energy will be affected by different scenarios. 
Cooperative Model 
During the past decades, the Brazilian electricity industry developed under a 
government owned monopoly. At the federal level, the country has been divided into 
four energy companies charged with the production and transmission of energy. 
Generally, they sell their production to local utilities. However, depending on the 
supply voltage (i.e., 230 kV and above), they may directly supply large consumers. 
At the distribution level, there are many different utilities whose concession areas 
coincide with the administrative boundaries of the local government. Usually, they buy 
the energy they need to meet the market from the government energy companies. 
However, many of them possess their own hydro generation and, occasionally, 
thermal power plants. 
In this model, the energy market requirements are met cooperatively. All of the energy 
companies benefit from this monopoly. The energy supply and demand of all 
companies are treated as one and the goal of dispatch is the overall optimization of 
the system. Finally, the prices are fixed through a federal order and do not reflect 
market forces. The values are bundled, i.e., energy production and transmission costs 
are not viewed separately. 
Competitive Model 
The state monopoly and cooperative model no longer exist. The Brazilian electricity 
industry is now moving towards a competitive model. Without describing this new 
model in detail, some aspects of it are of vital importance in assessing the appropriate 
actions of a competitive utility in a free market. 
Initial Contracts 
During the transition period, the energy supply of the distribution utilities is ensured 
by special contracts (i.e. Initial Contracts). They guarantee adequate supply to the 
energy market at present contractual conditions until the year 2001. That means that 
the utility will continue to receive the energy necessary to supply its market (except for 
its own generation). In 2002, the level of 2001 is guaranteed, therefore requiring the 
utility to look for a new energy supply to meet its market growth. Starting in 2003 the 
guaranteed amount will be linearly reduced until 2006. The difference between the 
contractual amount and the market requirements of the utility must be provided by 
either new generation plants, new bilateral contracts or short term purchases on the 
open market. 
Open Access and Transmission Pricing 
ANEEL Order 459 sets the conditions for open access to the transmission and 
distribution grids. It also determines the costs to move any amount of power over the 
entire system as well as the costs of the associated losses. 
Competition in Retail Sales (Commercialization) 
As a consequence of the introduction of competition in commercialization, some 
consumers (e.g., above 10 MW) are now free to choose their energy retailer. For 
economic and administrative reasons and the volume of their energy contracts, large 
consumers are more likely to consider this option. Utilities are aware of this and will 
take steps to keep their present customers. Moreover, new contracts must take into 
account the costs associated with the utilization of the distribution grid (i.e., the wire) 
of the local distribution company. 
CEB Case Study 
During the transition period, the amounts of energy ensured by the initial contracts 
with the distribution utilities will be gradually reduced. As a consequence, they must 
replace them with other sources of energy. Considering all the alternatives is a 
complex matter that depends not only on the available energy sources (present and 
future), but also on the strategy adopted by the utility to supply its energy market. 
As part of its new strategy for the competitive model, CEB became a partial owner of 
two new hydro plants under construction. It owns 35 percent of the Queimado Plant 
and 20 percent of the Lajeado Plant (Figure 1). 
Presently, CEB receives most of its energy from Furnas and Itaipu. It owns a diesel 
thermal plant and a hydro plant. The two hydro plants now under construction should 
come into service in 2002. Also, there is the option of constructing a gas pipeline and a 
gas thermal plant by 2005. 
The Market Division of CEB forecasts a market growth of about 5 percent a year for the 
period 1999-2007 (Figure 2). 
With the open access policy, the cost of moving energy from one point of the system 
to another is unbundled from the cost of energy production. These costs will increase 
the price of the energy delivered to the utility system and will obviously affect any 
energy contract. For example, Order 459 sets the transmission cost from FURNAS to 
CEB at $0.79/kW (i.e., $1.69/MWh assuming a 65 percent load factor). Now suppose 
that the Serra da Mesa Hydro Plant (Figure 1) owner is willing to sell energy to CEB, 
Assuming the same load factor, the transmission cost from this plant to CEB would be 
$6.43/MWh. Since CEB now pays about $36.00/MWh for the energy it buys from 
FURNAS, the new producer must offer its product at least 19 percent cheaper to 
become competitive. 
The total load of a category of CEB’s consumers (i.e., supplied at 88 to 138 kV) is 16.7 
MW and 57.1 MW during peak and off-peak hours, respectively. If this load profile 
repeats every day, its monthly energy consumption will be 37,5 GWh. It is worth 
noting that this value corresponds to an average power consumption of 52 MW, which 
represents about 11 percent of the total average load of CEB (Figure 2). Based on the 
tariffs being used by CEB, these consumers’ invoices total $1.67 million per month. If 
the market price of energy is $40/MWh, it would cost CEB $1.50 million to acquire the 
energy to supply these consumers. In the concession area of CEB, Order 459 fixes the 
cost of distribution as $2.41/kW per month. Thus, the profit margin for these 
consumers is $170,000, of which $137,000 corresponds to the grid remuneration and 
$33,000 to commercialization. 
 
Figura 1 - Main grid of the present Brasilia system and future supply alternatives considered in the study 
 Now consider these consumers being supplied by a new retailer. Based on the energy 
price and the distribution cost, the new retailer would spend $ 1.5 million for energy 
and $ 137,000 for the grid utilization. Considering that its tariffs might at most equal 
those of CEB, the new retailer has only a narrow margin of 2 percent ($33,000) to 
make an attractive proposal to the consumers. 
From this analysis, it is hard to believe that a consumer or group of consumers will 
change suppliers for such a narrow margin. On the other hand, the market price of the 
energy is the major component of consumer cost. If the new supplier has access to a 
cheaper source of energy, it can expand its margin and would be able to propose more 
attractive prices to the consumers. So the price of energy in the developing free 
market is a key issue in this matter and must be given due attention. 
CEB’s energy supply alternatives are as follows: 
• Initial Contract (IC). As the amounts of energy ensured by the initial contracts reduce 
to zero, CEB may replace them with energy contracted from FURNAS through bilateral 
contracts. This alternative is quite attractive, since both FURNAS and CEB will be 
interested in selling and buying quantities that differ from the initial contract. 
• Itaipu Binational (ITA). The contract with Itaipu will not be affected by the 
restructuring process, since Itaipu is a Brazil-Paraguay joint project. The study 
considers the values as they are presently established in the international contract. 
 
Figura 2 - Market forecast for the period under study 
 
• Paranoa Hydro Plant (UPA). This hydro plant has an installed capacity of 30 MW (i.e., 
3x10 MW) and a firm energy of 13 mean MW. Since it was constructed over 30 years 




• Diesel Thermal Plant (UTE). This diesel thermal plant has an installed capacity of 13 
MW (i.e., 2 x 6,5 MW) and a firm energy of 8 mean MW. In this study, its energy 
production was considered at $10/MWh, which does not really correspond to its 
production cost. In fact, this plant is considered as a technical reserve for the Brazilian 
Inter-connected System, and it only generates during emergency situations. As 
compensation for maintaining it available as a reserve, CEB receives the same amount 
of energy (i.e., 8 mean MW) from other hydro plants in the interconnected system. 
• Queimado Hydro Plant (QUE). CEB is an owner (i.e., 35 percent) of this hydro plant, 
planned to have an installed capacity of 105 MW (i.e., 3 x 35 MW) and a firm energy of 
61 mean MW. Presently under construction, its generators will come into service 
during 2002. In this study, its energy price is considered to be $40/MWh, including the 
trans-mission price. 
• Lajeado Hydro Plant (LAJ). CEB is an owner (i.e., 20 percent) of this hydro plant, 
planned to have an installed capacity of 850 MW (i.e., 6 x 141.7 MW) and a firm energy 
of 539.3 mean MW. Presently under construction, its generators will come into service 
during 2002. In this study, its energy price is considered to be $40/MWh, including the 
transmission price. 
 
 Figura 3 - Market and balance of energy with the gas supply alternative 
 
 
• Natural Gas Thermal Plant (GAS). The study considers the construction of a gas 
pipeline from Campinas (SP) to Brasilia and the installation of a thermal plant with an 
in¬stal led capacity of 250 MW and a firm energy of 150 mean MW. 
If we consider all the alternatives to supplying the market, it is possible to determine 
the amounts of energy to be contracted (TBC) by CEB either through bilateral contracts 
or in the short term market (Table I and Figure 3). 
Figure 3 shows the relative amounts of each supply alternative. It is interesting to note 
that CEB has a surplus of energy only in 2002. From 2003 until 2007, CEB has to 
contract increasing amounts of energy to supply its market. 
Economic Assessment 
In order to determine the value of the energy to CEB, simulations have been carried 
out based on the energy prices of the portfolio composed of the energy suppliers 
considered above (Table 2). 
At present, it is difficult to make a precise estimate of the price at which CEB will buy 





study was carried out considering three different prices for this energy: $35, $40, and 
$45 per MWh. 
Without the Gas Supplier 
Since the gas alternative still has many uncertainties associated with it (e.g., 
construction of the gas pipeline and the gas plant), in the first part of the study the 
prices of the energy in the portfolio have been determined without considering this 
supplier available. Table 3 shows the energy cost for CEB for each year. 
It is dear that the three scenarios have essentially the same price until 2003. This is 
quite evident, since until this year, CEB maintains about the same contractual 
conditions. From 2004 to 2007, the prices increase accordingly to the price of the new 
contracted energy. The greater this price, the greater the price of CEB’s energy 
portfolio. 
 
 Figura 4 - Energy price without gas supply 
 
Figura 5 - Energy price with gas supply 
From an analysis of Figure 4, one can see that the strategy of CEB in becoming a 
party of new hydro plant projects limits the variations in price of the CEB energy 
portfolio to a narrow range, even considering a large variation in the prices of 




With the Gas Supplier 
In order to determine the influence of the gas supplier alternative, the second 
part of the study considered the cost of this new supplier in the energy portfolio. 
Considering the construction of the gas pipeline and the gas plant, the latter will 
start commercial operation during 2005 (i.e., 75 mean MW) and will reach full 
operation in 2006 (i.e., 150 mean MW). Preliminary studies estimated that the 
price of the energy produced by the gas plant will be around $32/MWh and this 
was the value adopted in the study. 
Comparing Table 4 with the corresponding values of Table 3, one verifies that 
the values considering the gas supplier are lower. This is quite evident, since part 
of the energy to be contracted has been supplied by a cheaper energy source. It 
is worth noting that the gas alternative is even cheaper than the lower price 
assumed to buy the energy (Figures 4 and 5). 
Conclusions 
The Brazilian electricity industry restructuring process has many important 
consequences for the energy market and utilities. Utilities must make a major 
effort to adapt themselves to this new competitive environment. Retail 
competition is a key issue in this process. If utilities do not become competitive 
rapidly, they risk losing part of their market to other agents acting in this 
environment. 
Although prices still contain a large degree of uncertainty, strategic decisions must 
be made right now for the utilities to compose their energy portfolio and to 
ensure hedging to its prices. In this context, natural gas seems to be an attractive 
solution, especially if the utility has access to a nearby gas source. 
In the case of CEB, simulations of price considering the strategic decisions already 
made showed that the prices of energy are limited into a narrow range. 
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